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Ward: Ward: Plea Best Not Taken:

A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal
Defendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea
Bryan H. Ward"
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal defense attorneys are occasionally confronted with a
conundrum-a defendant who insists that he is innocent, yet against whom the
evidence is overwhelming. Such defendants refuse to admit their guilt, often a
prerequisite to consummating a plea bargain, yet fear going to trial due to the
perceived inevitable result of a finding of guilt. Since 1970 these defendants
have had the benefit of a hybrid plea known as the Alford plea-a reference to
the case of North Carolina v. Alfordl-in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld a plea of guilty made by a defendant who contemporaneously
asserted his innocence to the underlying offense. Since Alford, criminal defense
attorneys have been able to offer their clients the option of maintaining their
claims of innocence while still taking advantage of a plea bargain offer which
would require them to plead guilty.2 Some commentators and criminal defense
attorneys see the Alford plea as a positive step for criminal defendants who wish
to maintain their innocence without losing the ability to lock in a good plea
bargain with a guilty plea.3 As the old adage prophetically states, "Be careful
* Director of Clinical Programs and Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern
University College of Law. B.A., 1983, Ohio Northern University; J.D., 1986, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Ph.D., 1993, The Ohio State University. The author
wishes to thank the law faculty of Ohio Northern University and in particular Professors
Howard Fenton, Scott Gerber and Liam O'Melinn for their useful comments. The author
also wishes to thank Heather Cherepkai and Danielle Groh for their research assistance.
1. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2. The Alford plea is not a rarely occurring event. A recent check on Westlaw
discovered 1,319 "hits" on the phrase "Aiford plea" in all courts in the past ten years
alone.
3. See, e.g., DAVID RoSSMAN, 2-9 CRIMINAL LAW ADVOCACY § 9.26[2][a-c]
(2002); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,84 YALE
L.J. 1179 (1975); Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty PleaProcess in Indiana: A Proposalto
Strengthen the DiminishingFactualBasis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REv. 1127 (2001);
Curtis J. Shipley, The Alford Plea: A NecessaryBut UnpredictableToolfor the Criminal
Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (1987); Steven E. Walbum, Should the Military Adopt
an Alford-type Guilty Plea?,44 A.F. L. REV. 119 (1998). Interestingly, those who have
come out in opposition to the Alford plea have typically claimed that it is too lenient to
the criminal defendant and undermines justice. See, e.g., Steven E. Henderson, Hyacked
from Both Sides-Why Religious Extremists and Religious Bigots Share an Interest in
PreventingAcademic Discourse on CriminalJurisprudenceBasedon the First Principles
of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 103, 122-23 (2000) (stating that Alford pleas are
inconsistent with Christian criminal jurisprudence); Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

what you ask for because you just might get it." This admonition is particularly
the case with the Alford plea.
It is the thesis of this Article that the Alford plea is not the boon to criminal
defendants that some commentators and criminal defense attorneys perceive it
to be. Availing oneself of anAlford plea may result in a stiffer sentence than that
imposed on someone who merely pleads guilty. In addition, in some types of
cases, it may be more likely that a defendant's probation will be revoked if he
utilizes anAlfordplea and wishes to continue to maintain his innocence. Finally,
in some situations it may be more difficult to be released on parole if a defendant
has sought the benefit of an Alford plea but continues to assert his innocence.
Courts have consistently upheld sentence aggravation for defendants who have
pled guilty, but maintained their innocence based on their "lack of remorse." In
addition, courts have revoked defendants' probation because after utilizing the
Alford plea and asserting their innocence, they fail to admit their offense as part
of a probation-mandated counseling program. Finally, courts have upheld the
denial of parole to defendants who have utilized the Alford plea, professed their
innocence, and then failed to admit their guilt while in prison.
After examining the Alford decision in detail, this Article will first look at
the broad arguments in favor of this type of plea. This Article will then focus on
the body of case law dealing with the Alford plea and its effect on sentencing,
probation and parole. While examining these cases this Article will also focus
on the variety of arguments offered by criminal defendants who contend that it
is impermissible to require an Alford-type defendant to express remorse for the
offense or admit to the offense in any other context.4 This Article will conclude

RestructuringThrough Law: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders
and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 579, 583-86 (1992) (stating that
Alfordpleas are inconsistent with therapeuticj urisprudence); David A. Starkweather, The
Retributive Theory of "JustDeserts'" and Victim Participationin Plea Bargaining,67
IND. L.J. 853, 866-67 (1992) (stating thatAlford pleas are contrary to retributive justice);
Victor I. Vieth, When the Child Abuser Is a Child: Investigating, Prosecutingand
TreatingJuvenile Sex Offenders in the New Millennium, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 47, 67-68
(2001) (stating that Alford pleas are inappropriate when dealing with sexual offenders).
4. It is useful at this point to address the obvious objection to any attempt to extend
the future benefits of a protestation of innocence to any Alford plea defendant. Cynics
would contend that the Alford plea is merely a means by which a criminal can once more
avoid accepting responsibility for his actions. While it is undoubtedly true that a fair
number of defendants who utilize the Alford plea do so for reasons other than being
factually innocent, the fact remains that our justice system permits these pleas to be
entered. That being the case, those who choose to avail themselves of the Alford plea
should not be afforded less due process than anyone in the system--whatever the plea
they choose. The system as a whole should never undermine the informed nature of a
guilty plea--even for a guilty defendant.
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by reevaluating the arguments advanced in favor of the Alford plea in light of the
cases examined.
II. NORTH CAROLINA V. ALFORD
Proponents of the Alford plea often forget the basic history of the case.
Henry C. Alford found his case before the United States Supreme Court because
he had objected to the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea. Alford had
repeatedly challenged the acceptance of the plea based on his contention that his
plea of guilty had been involuntarily induced.' This challenge gained momentum
for Alford only after the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Jackson.6 On appeal from the denial of his second habeas corpus motion,
Alford argued that, as in Jackson, Alford had been denied his rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.7
In North Carolina, an accused who pled guilty to a capital offense could only be
sentenced to life in prison, whereas, if the same defendant took his case to a jury
and lost, the jury had the authority to impose the death penalty.' Alford argued
that, in such circumstances, a criminal defendant is compelled to forgo his right
to a trial by jury and right to refrain from self-incrimination in order to spare his
life.9 It was precisely this "chilling effect" that the Court in Jackson had
precluded." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Alford and
vacated the judgment entered on Alford's plea." Interestingly, it was only in a
footnote at the end of the opinion that the majority even referred to the issue of
a guilty plea being accepted by a defendant who vocally protests his innocence.
As the court noted,
Whether petitioner is in reality guilty or innocent has not been
judicially determined. In any event, petitioner has never conceded his
guilt. That fact alone should have precluded plea bargaining under the
rule announced in Bailey v. MacDougall. "Plea bargaining that
induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot be sanctioned.
5. Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340,341-42 (4th Cir. 1968), vacated by 400
U.S. 25 (1970).
6. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Jackson Court invalidated the capital punishment
clause of the Federal Kidnapping Act because it encouraged defendants to waive their
constitutional right to trial by providing for no more than life imprisonment for those who
plead guilty, and reserving the death penalty for those who went to trial and lost. Id. at
581-83.

7. Alford, 405 F.2d at 343.
8. Id. at 344.
9. Id. at 343.
10. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
11. Alford, 405 F.2d at 349.
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[Negotiation] must be limited12 to the quantum of punishment for an
admittedly guilty defendant.'
It was on the issue of voluntariness and the applicability of Jackson that the
case came before the Supreme Court. References to Alford's protestations of
innocence at the time of the acceptance of his guilty plea were rare in the parties'
briefs. Alford argued that "plea bargaining should never be permitted where a
defendant consistently proclaims his innocence and declares that he is submitting
his guilty plea only to avoid a more severe penalty."' 3 In addition, Alford
contended, "Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against
the defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the
acts charged in the indictment."' 4 Oddly enough, the State of North Carolina
tended to agree with the proposition that only those who acknowledge guilt
should be permitted to plead guilty when it observed, "[D]efendants who
acknowledge[] their guilt and wish to avoid the ignominy of public trial have
traditionally been allowed to plead guilty ....
Despite the paucity of argument regarding protestations of innocence and
pleas of guilty the Supreme Court devoted the largest part of its majority opinion
to a justification of the trial court's actions in Alford on this issue. The Court
quickly dismissed the basis of the lower court's ruling by contending that the
decision in Jackson did not alter the fundamental standard which "was and
remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant."' 6 The Court concluded that
simple fear of the death penalty was not enough, without other evidence, to
conclude that the plea was not "the product of a free and rational choice."' 7 The
Court did not stop there however, noting, "[W]e would, without more, vacate
and remand the case for further proceedings . . . if it were not for other
circumstances appearing in the record which might seem to warrant an
affirmance of the Court of Appeals."' 8

12. Alford, 405 F.2d at 349 n.22 (quoting Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155,
158 n.7 (4th Cir. 1968).
13. Brief for Appellee at 11, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (No. 14),
availableat 1969 WL 100915.
14. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 4, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970) (No. 14), availableat 1970 WL 116891.
15. Appellant's Brief at 11-12, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (No.
14), availableat 1969 WL 100914.
16. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
17. Id.

18. Id. It is interesting to note how the record of the trial court's proceedings was
not part of the overall record in any of Alford's prior habeas corpus actions before the
1967 court of appeals case. As the court of appeals observed, "[T]his is the first time that
the transcript of petitioner's original trial and of his state post-conviction proceedings
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The Court then proceeded to the crux of the case: the inconsistency
between the manner in which Alford pled guilty and what had historically been
accepted as proper guilty plea procedure. As the Court acknowledged, it had
previously observed in Brady v. United States19 that "a guilty plea is a grave and
solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment ....Central to the
plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the
defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the
indictment.""0 Despite this statement the Alford Court proceeded to allow a court
to accept the guilty plea of a criminal defendant who vocally protested his or her
innocence. The Court analogized these cases to cases in which a no contest plea
had been entered.2 The Court pointed out a number of no contest cases that
upheld a court's ability to impose a prison sentence on a defendant who has pled
no contest.22 The Alford Court then went on to note, "[T]hese cases would be
directly in point if Alford had simply insisted on his plea but refused to admit the
crime. The fact that the plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea
of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance ....'3 The Court's
holding is simple: while there is no constitutional right to plead guilty and yet
profess innocence, a trial court may accept such a plea if the defendant
intelligently and voluntarily concludes that his interests require such a plea and
if the record contains evidence of guilt.2 '
Many people forget that it was the state in North Carolina v. Alford that
sought the result that so many defense attorneys now praise. The prosecution in
Alford sought to impose the guilty plea on Henry Alford irrespective of his
recorded protestations of innocence. Alford challenged this plea throughout the
state courts and sought habeas corpus relief in federal court on two occasions, all
based on his contention that it was fundamentally inconsistent to claim innocence
and yet plead guilty. Defense attorneys should keep in mind that the Alford plea
was not a fundamental right wrested from an unwilling prosecution, but rather
was a means by which the prosecution was able to retain a questionable plea of
guilty. This being the case, defense attorneys would be well served to maintain
a healthy degree of skepticism when presented with the opportunity to accept an
Alford plea by an eager state's attorney. While the philosophical objections to
have both been before the full court." Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 343 (4th
Cir. 1968), vacated by 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
19. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
20. Id. at 748.
21. Alford, 400 U.S. at 35-37.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 37. For an excellent historical criticism of the Court's conflating the no
contest plea with the plea in Alford, see Neil H. Cogan, EnteringJudgment on a Plea of
Nolo Contendere: A ReexaminationofNorth Carolina v. Alford andSome Thoughts on
the Relationship Between Proofand Punishment, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 992 (1975).
24. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38.
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such a plea are obvious, it is the practical consequences that are the focus of this
Article." First, however, it may be useful to examine some of the arguments in
favor of the plea propounded by its supporters.
IH. WHY WE SHOULD ALL LEARN TO LOVE THE ALFORD PLEA
Over time a number ofjustifications for the Alford plea have been advanced
from the perspective of the defendant and defense counsel. These justifications
have had the effect of becoming "common knowledge" for the defense bar. It is
important to recognize that these justifications are advanced exclusively from the
perspective of the defendant and do not typically consider the effect of Alford
pleas on the justice system as a whole.26
The primary justification given by Alford plea advocates is that such a plea
minimizes the severity of the punishment a defendant receives." The argument
is that, as with any other form of plea bargaining, anAlfordpleathat is associated
with a plea bargain includes an implied promise of a lesser sentence.2" As is the
case with all plea bargains, the hope of a reduction in punishment is the prime
motivation for defendants to waive a significant number of constitutional rights

25. Philosophically, it may be difficult for the outside observer to understand who
the plea is really intended to help. Most casual observers would be hard pressed to
understand why any innocent defendant would willingly enter a plea of guilty. Sadly,
there are a number of reasons why a truly innocent defendant might be willing to plead
guilty. They include:
(1) the potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against him; (2) the
disparity in punishment between conviction by plea and conviction at trial; (3)
a desire to protect family or friends from prosecution; (4) the conditions of
pretrial incarceration; (5) a concern that fuller inquiry at trial may result in
disclosure of additional facts which could increase the sentence in the present
case or result in additional prosecutions; (6) a desire to expedite the
proceedings because of feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, or despair
when faced with the power of the state; (7) pressure from family, friends, or
attorneys; and (8) "ignorance, deception, delusion, feelings of moral guilt, or
self-destructive inclinations."
John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfor All Felony and MisdemeanorPleas: Voluntary
Pleasbut Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 96-97 (1977) (quoting State v.
Durham, 498 P.2d 149, 151 (Ariz. 1972)).
26. For one criticism of the underlying rationale for Alford pleas, see Abraham S.
Goldstein, ConvergingCriminalJusticeSystems: Guilty Pleasand the Public Interest,
49 SMU L. REV. 567, 573 (1996) ("An equivocal plea of guilty invites suspicion about
the processes of justice. And that suspicion, inevitably, does serious damage to the
symbolic, deterrent, and correctional functions of criminal law.").
27. ROSSMAN, supra note 3, § 9.26[2][a].
28. Id.
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and enter a plea of guilty (or no contest) to a criminal charge.29 This implied
promise is often coupled with an implied threat that if a defendant chooses to
exercise his or her right to a trial, particularly a bench trial, the punishment could
be significantly greater.3" Often this implied threat carries overtones of a "going
to trial penalty," which has been uniformly invalidated by courts of appeals
where the record clearly shows that the trial court imposed such a penalty.3 ' The
added benefit of the Alford plea, according to some observers, is that the
defendant may obtain the benefits of a plea bargain, and avoid the dangers of
trial, without actually admitting that he committed the offense in question. As
one commentator has noted, "[W]hile an accused may be reluctant to admit guilt
to the charged offense, he may be willing to enter an Alford plea to the charge.
. . inorder to lessen the potential maximum punishment faced. 32 Thus, the
Alford plea offers a perceived advantage for the defendant who refuses to admit
his guilt, but wishes to obtain the benefit of a plea bargain.
A second perceived advantage is that of certainty. Not only will the Alfordtype defendant receive a lesser sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, he will
also have the benefit of knowing what his sentence will be prior to its
imposition.33 This knowledge is thought to be a great benefit to the risk averse
defendant. If a particular defendant cannot tolerate the risk and uncertainty of
going to trial and relying upon a judge's discretion at sentencing, should he be
found guilty, he may be willing to sacrifice the right to a jury trial to ensure a
particular sentence or range of sentences. Of course, as all criminal defense
attorneys know, there is no guarantee that a particular sentence will be imposed
insofar as the court is not bound, with respect to sentencing, by any plea bargain
agreement to which it was not a party.34 Commentators have argued that the risks
associated with going to trial are so enormous that defendants may choose to
plead guilty so as to be able to avoid those risks. Alford-type defendants, they

29. See F. Andrew Hessick III& Reshma Saujani, PleaBargainingandConvicting
the Innocent: The Role ofthe Prosecutor,the Defense Counsel,and the Judge, 16 BYU

J.PUB. L. 189, 201 (2002).
30. "The primary force behind plea bargaining is differential sentencing.
Defendants plead guilty because they believe that if they stood trial they would be
punished more severely. This incentive underlies almost all plea bargains no matter
whether they involve charge concessions, explicit sentence concessions, or implicit
sentence concessions." WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES
AND COMMON PRACTICES 93 (1985).

31. See United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Walbum, supra note 3, at 142.
33. ROSSMAN, supra note 3, § 9.26[2][b].
34. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(e), at

930 (2d ed. 1992).
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claim, may thus not only avoid the risk of trial and the uncertainty it holds, but
may do so without being forced to admit guilt."
Finally, commentators have observed that the Alford plea is good for
defendants and defense counsel in that it takes away a major incentive for
defendants to lie-both to their attorneys and in court.36 The argument is that
criminal defendants are under enormous pressure to lie to their counsel regarding
guilt or innocence. Should the defendant admit his or her guilt, the defense
attorney is limited by the rules of professional conduct in the manner in which he
can represent the accused.37 Should the defendant deny his involvement, the
attorney may have nothing to work with in plea negotiations. This may affect the
manner in which the attorney negotiates a plea bargain or may restrain an
attorney from seeking a plea agreement if an admission of guilt is a prerequisite.
Even if an acceptable plea agreement is negotiated, the criminal justice system
encourages the defendant to lie. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty, absent
the Alford plea, the defendant must often also admit the facts which establish the
charge. For an innocent defendant who has decided that it is in his best interests
to accept a plea bargain the choices are clear: either lie and admit guilt or run the
risk of an uncertain result by rejecting the plea and proceeding to trial.3" This
scenario also poses an ethical dilemma for the attorney. Is it ethical to permit a
client to lie in court and plead guilty when they have privately indicated their
innocence?39 The Alford plea removes many of these concerns. The defendant
is perceived to be free to tell the truth with the knowledge that the opportunity to
plea bargain will exist whether he denies actual guilt or not. Attorneys are no
longer placed in ethical dilemmas and defendants are no longer encouraged
to lie.40
IV. DOES THEORY MATCH REALITY?
Despite these facially appealing arguments, the history and use oftheAlford
plea indicate that there is a great gap between the expected benefits and the actual

35. As Rossman notes, as long as high stakes risks are a part of the criminal justice
system, "courts should not force defendants to run the risk, and pretend that it is in their
best interest." ROSSMAN, supra note 3, § 9.26[2][b].
36. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 3, at 1074.
37. See MODELCODEOFPROF'LRESPONSiBiLiTYDR 7-102(A)(4), DR 7-109(A)(6)
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, R. 3.4(2001).

38. Shipley, supra note 3, at 1073.
39. Id. at 1074; see also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosureand Accuracy in the
Guilty PleaProcess, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 989 n.91 (1989).

40. Removing the incentive for criminal defendants to lie is seen to be a major
benefit to the criminal justice system as a whole insofar as it cannot be healthy for a
system seeking truth to, in certain circumstances, reward dishonesty. Shipley, supranote
3, at 1073.
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results. In particular, Alford pleas have resulted in anything but certainty and
avoidance of risk. For a defendant facing sentencing, probation revocation, or
parole review, the entry of an Alford plea often provides a false sense of security
as to the results which will be obtained. In addition, it has become apparent that
lying might be necessary in order to ensure the results that the Alford plea was
intended to provide.
V. SENTENCING
Perhaps the most important factor in any plea bargaining situation is the
ultimate penalty facing the defendant. As discussed above, a prime incentive for
those who are asked to forgo their right to trial, right to a jury, right to confront
their accusers and call witnesses on their behalf, and their right to force the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is that they will
receive a lesser and somewhat certain punishment. The Alford plea is intended
to pass this benefit on to those defendants who have calculated that a guilty plea
is in their best interests, but cannot bring themselves to admit the accusations in
question. The reality is that pleading guilty while professing innocence may
insert an element of risk and uncertainty into the sentencing process that does not
exist for those who merely plead guilty.
This unexpected element is that of remorse. 4 ' Remorse, as it affects
sentencing, is intended to reflect the defendant's contrition and measure the
likelihood that the defendant will engage in future criminal activity.42 Remorse
finds its way into the sentencing process in two ways. Some jurisdictions view
remorse as a mitigating factor. If a defendant exhibits remorse to the court (or
to the proper authorities during any pre-sentence investigation) the court may
impose a lesser sentence than for a defendant who does not exhibit remorse.43
Other jurisdictions view "lack of remorse" as an aggravating factor at the time

41. For my purposes "lack of remorse" also includes the failure of a defendant to
"accept responsibility" for his actions-an alternative phrase frequently used for the
same concept.
42. See, e.g., Fair v. State, 268 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 1980); Thomas v. Commonwealth,
419 S.E.2d 606, 619 (Va. 1992); State v. Jones, 444 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989).
43. Five states specifically address remorse statutorily as a mitigating factor. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(k)(2) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(J) (West 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1 340.16(e)(1 1), (15) (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982(B)
(West Supp. 2003); R.I. CT. RULES ANN. SUPERIOR CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS I(i)
(Michie 2002). For case law indicating the appropriateness of considering remorse as a
mitigating factor at sentencing, see, e.g., State v. McKinney, 946 P.2d 456, 458 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Mills, 764 N.E.2d 854, 866 n.9 (Mass. 2002); State
v. Buttrey, 756 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
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of sentencing." In these jurisdictions the court may, and in some circumstances
must, enhance a defendant's sentence if he or she does not display an appropriate,
or sincere, level of remorse at sentencing (or before the proper authorities during
the course of a pre-sentence investigation). While the appropriateness of remorse
as a factor to consider in sentencing is debatable in any circumstance,45 the
application of such a factor is particularly suspect in the case of an Alford-type
defendant. Remorse is defined as "a feeling of compunction or deep regret and
repentance for a sin or wrong committed."" By definition, Alford-type
defendants have no remorse because they deny all participation in any way in the

44. Ohio is the only state to statutorily define "lack of remorse" as an aggravating
factor at sentencing. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2929.12(D)(5) (Anderson 2002). For case
law indicating the appropriateness of considering "lack of remorse" as an aggravating
factor at sentencing, see, e.g., State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1993); People v.
Gonzales, 926 P.2d 153, 156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Isaaks v. State, 386 S.E.2d 316,323
(Ga. 1989); State v. Trevino, 980 P.2d 552, 560 (Idaho 1999); People v. Mulero, 680
N.E.2d 1329, 1337 (III. 1997); McAbee v. State, 770 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. 2002); State
v.Dicks, 473 N.W.2d 210,216 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hanby, 957 P.2d 428,437
(Kan. 1998); State v. Young, 786 So. 2d 228, 229-30 (La. Ct. App. 2001); State v.
Goodale, 711 A.2d 848, 849 (Me. 1998); Jennings v. State, 664 A.2d 903, 910 (Md.
1995); People v. Calabro, 419 N.W.2d 791,793 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Shreves,
60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002); State v. Jackson, 265 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Neb. 1978);
State v. Hammond, 742 A.2d 532, 538-39 (N.H. 1999); State v. O'Donnell, 564 A.2d
1202, 1206 (N.J. 1989); Swafford v. State, 810 P.2d 1223, 1237 (N.M. 1991); People v.
Griswold, 747 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Camron v. State, 829 P.2d 47,
57 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Miller, 724 A.2d 895, 902 (Pa. 1999);
State v. Mollicone, 746 A.2d 135, 138 (R.I. 2000); State v. Clegg, 635 N.W.2d 578, 580
(S.D. 2001); State v. Daly, 641 A.2d 91, 93 (Vt. 1993); State v. Ramires, 37 P.3d 343,
352 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Baldwin, 304 N.W.2d 742, 750-52 (Wis. 1981);
Yates v. State, 723 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo. 1986).
45. It can be argued that remorse is a factor which should not be considered at
sentencing for two reasons. First, it is nearly impossible for a court to accurately assess
the level of sincerity of a person who professes remorse at the time of sentencing. One
can certainly argue that factors to be considered for purposes of sentencing should be as
objective as possible to remove additional layers of subjective discretion from the
criminal justice system. In addition, the use of such a factor arguably encourages lying
to the court, with every criminal defendant being compelled to exhibit an appropriate
level of remorse, no matter how insincere that may in fact be. Surely the system should
not encourage defendants to offer false apologies during sentencing merely to avoid a
potential sentence enhancement.
46. OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY Vol. XLII, at 598 (2d ed. 1989).
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crime.47 One would assume, therefore, that Alford-type defendants would be
spared an assessment of their remorse at sentencing.
Unfortunately for Afford-type defendants, such an assumption is incorrect.
Courts throughout the country have consistently and nearly uniformly refused to
"exempt" Afford-type defendants from an assessment of remorse at the time of
their sentencing.48 The rationale for these decisions is nearly always the same. 9
The courts conclude that the mere fact that an Afford plea is entered affords the
defendant no rights different from one who pleads guilty or is found guilty."
Rather, the courts conclude, for example, that the Supreme Court's decision in
Afford "does not require ... that a court accept a guilty plea from a defendant
while simultaneously treating the defendant as innocent for purposes of
sentencing.... Although an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid
assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions."'"
Elaborating on this point, other courts have noted, "'There is nothing inherent in
the nature of an Afford plea that gives a defendant any rights, or promises any
limitations, with respect to the punishment imposed after the conviction.' ... The
defendant's assertion of innocence extends only to the plea itself."52 One might

47. Some trial courts have acknowledged the inherent problem this poses. See, for
example, State v. Weaver, No. 91-2568-CR-FT, 1992 WL 126807, at *2(Wis. Ct. App.
Mar. 24, 1992), in which the trial court noted, "First of all, it's always difficult when
there has been an Afford Plea entered because, on the one hand, by virtue of an Alford
Plea there is no acceptance of responsibility; in fact, there is a denial that the offense was
committed; and I accepted that plea knowing that that was the problem in this case."
48. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 366 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Howry,
896 P.2d 1002 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); State v. Philpot, No. M2000-01999-CCA-R3-CD,
2001 WL 473842 (Tenn. Crim. App. May2, 2001); Smith v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d
11 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Westcott, No. 97-0419-CR, 1998 WL 692827 (Wis. Ct.
App. Oct. 7, 1998); Weaver, 1992 WL 126807.
49. There is a somewhat different rationale for those jurisdictions in which "lack
of remorse" is not an aggravating factor, but rather the presence of remorse is a mitigating
factor at sentencing. The best example is found in the federal cases dealing with Alford
pleas and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The guidelines afford a point reduction for
sentencing purposes for those defendants who demonstrate remorse. Not surprisingly,
many Alford-type defendants object to the problem their plea creates in such a system.
This argument makes no headway, however, with federal courts strictly adhering to the
guideline requirement that the defendant clearly accept responsibility before receiving the
acceptance of responsibility reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176
(5th Cir. 1994). One rationale for this may be that in the case of a benefit bestowed
rather than a punishment inflicted the courts are less inclined to be concerned with the
defendant's ability to obtain the benefit.
50. See, e.g., State v. Jarrett, No. 02C01-9808-CC-00251, 1999 WL 222439, at *3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 1999).
51. Howry, 896 P.2d at 1004.
52. Westcott, 1998 WL 692827, at *3 (quoting State ex rel.Warren v. Schwarz, 566

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

fairly ask why a criminal defendant would ever enter an Alford plea if, as these
cases suggest, the possible result is a sentence greater than for a defendant who
merely pled guilty.
The Virginia Court of Appeals, recognizing the contradiction, made a
valiant attempt to impose some safety valve for the wayward Alford-type
defendant in Smith v. Commonwealth." However, this effort merely reenforces
the illogic of the situation. In Smith the defendant, Damien Smith, Jr., argued
that entering an Alford plea required the court to disregard his lack of remorse at
the time of sentencing.5" The court adopted the usual reasoning" and concluded
that an Alford plea was like any other guilty plea for sentencing purposes. 6 The
court went on, however, to attempt to minimize the harsh nature of such a finding
by observing, "Appellant's denial ofresponsibility would not be inconsistent with
an expression of sympathy for the victims of the 'situation' to which he referred
during allocution. . . . [A]n expression of remorse does not presuppose
acceptance of criminal responsibility."" The court rationalized this conclusion
by noting, "Appellant was not compelled to testify against himself; he merely had
to choose whether to show sympathy for the victims.""8 One need not be unduly
cynical to have serious reservations about the "advice" given by the Smith court. 9
It seems very unlikely that a court willing to consider anAlford-type defendant's
remorse, or lack thereof, would accept a denial of responsibility coupled with an
expression of sympathy for the victim as an adequate expression of sincere
remorse.6 That such "advice" would be suggested merely illustrates the

N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)).
53. 499 S.E.2d 11 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
54. Id. at 12.
55. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
56. Smith, 499 S.E.2d at 14.
57. Id.
58. Id. A Tennessee court attempted to square this circle by noting,
[T]he trial court may not rely upon a defendant's unwillingness to
acknowledge guilt in denying probation since a "best interest" orAlford plea
by definition does not acknowledge guilt. Nonetheless, a best interest plea,
as in the present case, does not immunize the defendant from questions which
implicate relevant sentencing considerations, such as lack of remorse ....
State v. Philpot, No. M2000-01999-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 473842, at *3 n.6 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 2, 2001).
59. In fact, in Smith, the court observed that the defendant "acknowledged that he
'hurted [sic] people in my life, my family' and was 'ashamed of being in this situation."'
Smith, 499 S.E.2d at 14. Nevertheless, this was not enough for the court, which noted
that the "appellant did not mention the victims of the shootings or their families." Id.
Given the level of education and articulation of most criminal defendants, attaining the
"appropriate" level of remorse would seem a very difficult task.
60. See People v. Bilski, 776 N.E.2d 882, 891-92 (III. App. Ct. 2002) (observing
"that defendant entered anAlfordplea-pleading guiltywhile maintaining his innocence.
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irrationality of considering the remorse of Alford-type defendants at sentencing
and again forces the question-why would you ever choose the Alford plea?
An additional statutory issue presents itself when considering the
conundrum ofAlfordpleas and sentencing. Somejurisdictions statutorily require
certain disclosures at the time a defendant enters a guilty plea. A possible
argument is that failure to disclose the consequences of an Alford plea would
violate those statutory requirements. For example, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 requires that the court address the defendant in open court and
determine that the defendant understands:
the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading; any
maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of
supervised release; any mandatory minimum penalty; any applicable
forfeiture; the court's authority to order restitution; the court's
obligation to impose a special assessment; the court's obligation to
apply the Sentencing Guidelines, and the court's discretion to depart
from those guidelines under some circumstances. 6
One "applicable" federal sentencing guideline permits courts to reduce a
sentence based on the "acceptance of responsibility" reduction.62 Federal courts
have consistently held that Alford-type defendants who are denied this reduction
are not "penalized" for their plea, but are simply not given the benefit extended
to other defendants.63 Yet, one could argue that, as part of the requirement to
disclose "any applicable sentencing guidelines," a defendant should be advised
of the unavailability of an acceptance of responsibility reduction when he utilizes
an Alford plea and does not express remorse.
To see how this argument might play out in the states it is instructive to look
at Ohio. Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code the sentencing judge shall consider
an offender's failure to show genuine remorse for the offense as a factor
indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes." If the Ohio
version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 included any inquiry into the
defendant's knowledge of the applicable sentencing guidelines, statutory
disclosure of the negative consequences of an Alford plea at sentencing in Ohio
would arguably be required. This disclosure is not statutorily mandated,

Proceeding in this manner is, at best, an equivocal acceptance of responsibility.")
(internal citation omitted); see also State v. Williams, 937 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) ("A subsequent guilty plea pursuant to Alford eliminates any showing of
remorse or taking of responsibility by the appellant.").
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(G-M).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (2002).
63. See United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d 307, 310 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(D)(5) (Anderson 2002).
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however, because Ohio's version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 omits
reference to sentencing guidelines.65
VI. PROBATION
The expectations of a criminal defendant who has entered an Alford plea
may extend well beyond the initial plea and sentencing. A plea bargain is often
"sold" to the defendant on the promise that he or she will not have to admit any
criminal wrongdoing. While this is true at the time of entering the plea,
jurisdictions throughout the country have uniformly concluded that defendants
may not continue to maintain their innocence thereafter. Often, when a criminal
defendant is placed on probation, he or she is expected to participate in
counseling or other programs intended to assist the defendant in avoiding the
conduct that resulted in the criminal conviction in question, rather than being
sentenced to serve actual jail time. In many circumstances, this counseling
addresses the events that led to the conviction. This is particularly true when
counseling sex offenders. The convicted sex offender, if placed on probation, is
usually required to engage in sexual offender counseling which often requires the
offender to "admit responsibility" for the underlying offenses." For the Alfordtype defendant, there is an inherent contradiction between the requirements of his
plea and the requirements of the mandatory counseling program. The defendant
often wishes to fall back upon the conditions of his guilty plea-a plea without
an admission. The courts, however, have consistently held that this expectation
is flawed.67 Thus, an Alford-type defendant who refuses to acknowledge his
offense during the course of counseling may have his probation revoked and his
underlying sentence imposed despite the expectations as to the admission of
responsibility that the Alford plea creates.
This is a very real possibility for the Alford-type defendant, as a large
proportion of the cases in which the Alford plea is utilized involve sex offenses."8
One can understand why a defendant would be most reluctant to admit, of all of
the types of criminal offenses, those offenses involving sexual misconduct.
Nonetheless, it is that very type of offense that often requires a future admission

65. OHIOR. CRIM. P. 11.
66. Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing
Rehabilitation Without Incrimination,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 365 (1998).
67. See, e.g., People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1130 (Colo. 1998); State v. Jones,
926 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996); Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589,590
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908,911 (Mont. 1995); State v. Alston,
534 S.E.2d 666,670 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d
698, 711 (Wis. 1998).
68. In fact, in every Alford plea case involving an appeal of the revocation of the
defendant's probation reviewed for this Article (eleven in all) the underlying offense
involved some form of sexual misconduct.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/4

14

Ward: Ward: Plea Best Not Taken:

2003]

A VOIDING THE ALFORD PLEA

of guilt in counseling. It is a point of some debate as to whether the admission
is necessary for success in sex offender counseling,69 but it is undeniable that
courts and court-sponsored counseling programs emphasize acknowledging
responsibility for one's offenses.70
When the offender objects to a revocation of his probation based on his
refusal to admit his past misconduct he often points to his Alford plea as
justification. Some defendants contend that if they were permitted to plead guilty
and were not required to accept responsibility for their offense it would be
contrary to the "deal" that this requirement would arise later on. Clearly, this
argument is based on the offender's expectation that the Alford plea negates the
need to ever admit the offense. As some defendants have claimed, maintaining
one's innocence pursuant to an Alford plea should be considered a lawful
excuse"' for later refusing to admit the offense during court-ordered counseling.
The argument seems to view the problem as one of a breach of the plea
agreement, or as an example of fundamental unfairness if not logical
inconsistency. The courts have rejected this "lawful excuse" argument." The
mere fact that one has entered an Alford plea does not confer any rights with
respect to future conduct and terms of probation." As the court in State ex rel.
Warren v. Schwarz74 succinctly stated, "Put simply, an Alford plea is not the
saving grace for defendants who wish to maintain their complete innocence.

69. Kaden, supra note 66, at 367-69. Kaden notes that the conventional view of
sex offender counseling is that confrontation with one's past is absolutely necessary to
overcome denial, which is an inhibitor to successful counseling. Other therapists argue,
however, that the confrontational approach is potentially detrimental to the offender by
reinforcing the lack of control the offender has over his conduct. These therapists prefer
a motivational approach which seeks to encourage changes in behavior by inspiring a
desire to change in the offender.
70. Id. at 365.
71. Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 669.
72. Id.; see also Butler,900 P.2d at 911-12 (concluding that revocation for failure
to admit prior conduct in counseling ordered as part of probation was permissible even
with an Alford-type defendant if the defendant was aware at the time of entering the plea
that he would be required to successfully complete sex offender counseling and that he
would not be able to successfully complete the counseling without admitting the
allegations).
73. One exception to the failure of courts to accept the "legal excuse" argument and
its fundamental fairness underpinnings is that of People v. Walters, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289,
291 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1995), in which an Alford-type defendant had his probation revoked
for refusing to admit his offense during counseling. The court held that "to require
defendant to admit his factual guilt during treatment, upon threat of incarceration, is
Id. The court overturned
directly inconsistent with the plea agreement entered into .....
the revocation "[a]s a matter of fairness, and in the interests ofjustice." Id.
74. 579 N.W.2d 698 (Wis. 1998).
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Rather, it is a device that defendants may call upon to avoid the expense, stress
and embarrassment of a trial and to limit one's exposure to punishment."75
A more innovative argument is that, before it is appropriate to revoke an
Alford-type defendant's probation for failure to subsequently admit an offense,
the defendant must know of the possible consequences of the Alford plea as it
pertains to court-ordered counseling and probation. Defendants argue that if they
are not informed at sentencing of the possibility that they must later admit their
guilt, then due process demands that the probation revocation be overturned or
that a withdrawal of the Alford plea be permitted. The due process argument is
premised primarily on Boykin v. Alabama,76 in which the Supreme Court held
that a guilty plea could not be accepted unless it was intelligently and voluntarily
made." Knowledge of the terms of the guilty plea is crucial. As the Court
observed inBoykin, "Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements,
subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality."78
However, most courts have summarily rejected this argument as well, contending
that such Alford pleas are voluntary and intelligent despite the missing
information. The courts note that the revocation of probation due to a failure to
admit prior misconduct is at most a collateral consequence ofthe Alford plea, and
that due process does not require the disclosure of potential consequences to the
defendant at the time they enter a guilty plea.79
The distinction between collateral consequences and direct consequences
is one of great constitutional import. The Supreme Court in Brady v. United
States8" held that it is necessary for a defendant to be "fully aware" of the direct
consequences of a guilty plea in order for the plea to be acceptable. 8 Over time
the courts have provided a piecemeal definition of "direct consequences," mainly
in a case-by-case evaluation of what information needs to be provided to a
defendant who seeks to enter a guilty plea.8" In general, however, a direct
consequence is viewed as one which has a definite, immediate and largely
automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.8 3 Conversely,
courts have concluded that it is not necessary to advise the defendant of the

75. Id. at 707.
76. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
.77. Id. at 243.

78. Id. at 242-43.
79. See, e.g., People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. 1998); Warren, 579
N.W.2d at 708-09.
80. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

81. Id. at 755.
82. For a general discussion of direct consequences jurisprudence see JAMES E.
BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS §§ 3.38-3.43(b) (2d ed. 1982); LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 34, § 21.4(d), at 936.

83. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
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collateral consequences of a plea of guilty.84 Defining "collateral consequences"
has also been pursued on a case-by-case basis. In the context of an Alford-type
defendant who is facing probation revocation for failing to subsequently admit
guilt as part of a court-ordered counseling program, a typical court rejection of
a due process claim points out that any information about the future effect of the
Alford plea is only information about a collateral consequence. As one court
observed:
[The defendant's] probation would not have been revoked had he
admitted his guilt at the probationary treatment programs he attended
during his five years on probation. Stated differently, the consequence
of probation revocation for failure to admit guilt during sex offender
counseling is not direct and immediate, or even "inevitable" as
[defendant] asserts.
It will instead depend upon defendants'
willingness to admit their guilt in a rehabilitative setting-a situation
which the circuit court, even if it is aware of all the consequences
attendant to the commission of a sexual offense such as this one, could
not be expected to anticipate or predict."
No court that I am aware of has ever held the potential ramifications of an
Alfordplea described above as anything but a collateral consequence of the guilty
plea. As such, there is no duty upon the trial judge to advise the defendant of the
possibility of probation revocation (and, consequently, no due process violation
if the possibility of probation revocation is not mentioned)., 6 As the court in
People v. Birdsong 7 observed, revocation of probation for an Alford-type
defendant is not automatic because "an individual might be willing to admit to

84. See BOND, supra note 82, § 3.44; LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 34, § 21.4(d),
at 936.

85. State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698, 708 (Wis. 1998).
86. The likelihood of any court finding these potential problems as anything other
than "collateral consequences" is remote. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
observed in reviewing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Warren
v. Schwarz,
[H]aving analyzed the same factors in its inquiry that this court would
examine to determine whether Warren's right to due process was violated, and
having reached the same result, we cannot say that the Wisconsin court's
determination was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law" or was "based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts."
Warren v. Richland County Circuit Court, 223 F.3d 454,457 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000)) (discussing Warren, 579 N.W.2d 698).
87. 958 P.2d 1124 (Colo. 1998).
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something in a therapeutic setting but not in a court of law.""8 The Birdsong
court went further by identifying judicial economy as another reason why the
potential negative consequences of an Alford plea should not be considered
anything but "collateral consequences." As the court proclaimed,
We do not expect a trial court to maintain working familiarity with all
requirements of certain types of treatment programs so as to be able to
advise defendants with particularity about those requirements before
accepting pleas that involve probation. That responsibility falls to the
defendant and his or her counsel.89
Absent a dramatic change in judicial philosophy nationwide, the voluntary and
intelligent due process argument in connection with Alford pleas is, for all
practical purposes, dead.9 °
One alternative to focusing on due process and the consequences of an
Alford plea when examining probation revocation may be to focus on the unique
nature of probation rather than attack the plea itself. Courts have consistently
held that a criminal defendant is entitled to due process during the course of a
revocation proceeding just as in the case in chief.9" Courts have also held that in
order for someone to have their probation revoked, they must have been informed
of the type of conduct that could lead to the revocation.92 As the court in United
States v. Simmons observed, "An essential component of these due process rights

88. Id. at 1128.
89. Id. The Birdsong court's reasoning is questionable. Assuming that it is the
responsibility of the defendant or his counsel to discover the requirements of a particular
program, one can envision a situation in which counsel makes inquiries to the sentencing
judge and may not, according to the reasoning in Birdsong, be able to expect an answer.
Given that often the treatment programs are outsourced to private counseling groups, one
would hope that at the time of contracting with a counseling group the judge had at least
inquired as to the requirements of the programs provided.
90. Even if the courts were to view the possibility of probation revocation as a
direct consequence of an Alford plea, the Alford-type defendant would not be guaranteed
relief. The majority of jurisdictions do not find such "technical" violations of court
imposed required disclosures to necessarily require overturning of a sentence or
withdrawal of a plea. As the United States Supreme Court observed in UnitedStates v.
Timmreck, the result of the court's oversight must result in some significant prejudice to
the defendant and be a substantial injustice. If the result was a sentence permitted by the
statute, the Court concluded, the defendant was not prejudiced and the "technical"
violation would be considered harmless error. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780,
783-84 (1979).
91. See United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. See id.; see also United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994); United States
v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
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is that individuals be given fair warning of acts which may lead to revocation."93
This right to fair warning appears to require that the warning be given at the time
of sentencing rather than after the plea has been accepted."4
Some courts have adopted the notion of "fair notice" when considering an
Alford-type defendant facing probation revocation for failure to admit
responsibility for the underlying offense in subsequent court-ordered counseling
programs." In State v. Faradaythe defendant pled guilty, via an Alford plea, to
sexual assault."6 He was placed on probation and required to complete sexual
offender treatment.97 Ultimately, he faced revocation of his probation for failure
to complete the treatment.9 ' Specifically, he was discharged from the program
for refusing to admit his guilt.99 The Faradaycourt focused on the notion of "fair
notice."' 00 The court observed, "' [T]here is a fundamental inconsistency between
an Alford plea and a probation condition that requires an admission of guilt.
.' Such an inconsistency is allowable if a defendant has fair notice that a
future denial of guilt may result in a violation of a condition of probation."' 0 '
Finding no such "fair notice" for the defendant, the court in Faradayrefused to
uphold the revocation of probation."0 2 The utility of this approach is obvious.
The court effectively avoided the entire discussion of "direct" versus "collateral"
consequences and a difficult analysis of whether the plea in question was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent as required by the Due Process Clause.
Rather, Faradayfocused on the revocation process, and the fundamental fairness
notion inherent in the concept of "fair warning."
Faradayaside, however, while Alford-type defendants may expect to be
able to continue their protestations of innocence beyond the short time frame of
the entry of their guilty plea, the reality is that the vast majority of courts have
dashed those expectations. In particular, when an Alford-type defendant is
required to enter into a counseling program as a condition of his or her probation,
failure to admit guilt within the context of counseling may be deemed a

93. Simmons, 812 F.2d at 565.
94. Dane, 570 F.2d at 844 (noting that "where the warning is not contained in a
formal condition, the record must be closely scrutinized to determine whether the
defendant did, in fact, receive the requisite warning").
95. See State v. Faraday, 794 A.2d 1098 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Birchler,
No. OOAP-311, 2000 WL 1473152 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2000).
96. Faraday,794 A.2d at 1100-01.
97. Id. at 1101.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1105.
100. Id. at 1108-09.
101. Id. at 1109 (quoting State v. Fisk, 682 A.2d 937, 938 (Vt. 1996)).
102. Id. A similar result was reached in State v. Birchier,which preceded Faraday
and was used as support for the "fair notice" concept. State v. Birchler, No. OOAP-311,
2000 WL 1473152, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2000).
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counseling failure that may result in revocation of probation. Alford-type
defendants cannot rely upon the courts to advise them of this fact, and when
courts do fail to so warn, defendants have not been successful in arguing that the
lack of this information should render their guilty plea suspect.
VII. PAROLE
For those Alford-type defendants who are sentenced to jail, the specter of
later having to admit their guilt is not removed. Many of these defendants will
ultimately seek parole from a prison sentence and at that time their expectations
with respect to their Alford plea may exceed reality. Most states have adopted a
process whereby an inmate seeking early release is required to appear before the
parole board to give reasons why early release should be permitted. Part of that
process may include consideration of the inmate's remorse, or lack thereof, for
the offense committed."0 3 For the Alford-type inmate, the problem is obvious.
If defendants consistently profess their innocence, as permitted at the time of
their plea, they may be denied parole due to their failure to express remorse or
failure to possess insight into the offense which led to their incarceration.
Once again, the courts have denied Alford-type defendants the right to rely
upon their Alford plea and continue to profess their innocence without
ramifications. The seminal case on this issue is Silmon v. Travis. °4 In Silmon,
the inmate, Herman Silmon, pled guilty to manslaughter via an Alford plea.0 5
He was sentenced to five to fifteen years in prison and appeared before the parole
board for consideration after serving five years of his sentence.'0 6 Ultimately, he
was denied parole based on the parole board's conclusion that "he lack[ed]
remorse and insight and accepted no responsibility for the actions that resulted
in the brutal homicide of his wife."' 7 Silmon contended that he was merely
acting consistently with his Alford plea in which he denied responsibility for the
crime and that it was "irrational" for the parole board to deny him parole.0 8 On
this basis alone, the court easily concluded that the parole board's decision was
permissible. As the court concluded,
The court's acceptance of his plea without an admission of culpability
was not an indication that the State viewed him as innocent.... Nor

was there any promise that petitioner would be treated as "innocent"
by the Parole Board. .

.

.Petitioner received the benefit of his

103. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-404 (West 2002).
104. 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (N.Y. 2000).
105. Id. at 705.
106. Id.
107. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
108. Id. at 706.
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negotiated plea when he was not required to admit to the specific facts
of the crime before the court. 10 9
Despite the fact that a due process argument was not raised, the Silmon court
went further and argued that the potential denial of parole due to a failure to
admit guilt is a "collateral consequence," thus undercutting the due process
argument as well. As the court observed, "There is no allegation that the court
failed to advise petitioner of the direct consequences of his plea." 1 ° The court
went further, stating, "A court accepting an Alford plea could, if it wished,
additionally advise a defendant that collateral consequences might later result
from a refusal to admit guilt-as, for example, in connection with parole."'' .
If anything, the few courts that have considered the arguments of Alfordtype defendants who have been denied parole based on a failure to accept
responsibility for their crimes have been more dismissive of the argument than
those courts considering probation. One court noted bluntly that the Alford
aspect of the argument "does not affect the analysis.""' Another Alford-type
defendant who asserted a "fundamental right" to be able to deny his offense
because of the Alford plea was informed, "Alford pleas do not afford appellant
a protected liberty interest in denying conduct for which he has been lawfully
convicted."'"'
No reported case law specifically addresses the issue of whether or not
information regarding the effect of the Alford plea on a request for parole is
considered a direct or collateral consequence of the guilty plea, but parole cases
in general offer little support for a due process argument. While the courts are
expected to advise a defendant pleading guilty to an offense that the offense in
question renders him ineligible for parole," 4 there is no requirement that the
judge discuss eligibility in general or the normal aspects of eligibility.'
Similarly, the fact that a parole board may deny a defendant's request for parole
is considered a "collateral consequence" that need not be disclosed. m'Given the
existing case law, it would be astounding if any defendant could prevail on the
due process argument in a parole denial case.

109. Id. at 707.
110. Id. at 707 n.2.
111. Id.
112. Cable v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 666 A.2d 967, 969 (N.H. 1995).
113. Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
114. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(d), at 170, 170 n.97
(2d ed. 1999).
115. See Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564, 565 (4th Cir. 1978).
116. Holland v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 733, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 571

F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1978).
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VIII. A FALSE REMEDY
One of the greatest obstacles to the entire body of due process arguments is
that while the arguments may or may not be compelling, the remedy for the
successful litigant may be no remedy at all. In the vast majority of the cases
involving the Alford plea and its unexpected consequences the defendants have
not offered the due process argument. They tend to rely on rather amorphous
arguments about fairness and inconsistency. The reason is obvious. For the
successfulAlfordplea/due process litigant the remedy is a withdrawal of the prior
plea and a return to square one. For most, this is no remedy at all. For
defendants who entered their Afford pleas after being confronted with
overwhelming evidence of their own guilt, starting over and going to trial is not
an appealing scenario. If they were to simply enter into the same plea agreement
the problems they had with the Alford plea would not go away. Rather, the trial
court would likely only provide them with enough information about the likely
consequences so as to avoid a future due process argument. One would have to
ask, again, is it all worth it?
IX. OTHER PROBLEMS
A relatively new problem for Alford-type defendants is the Sexual Offender
Registration Act, otherwise known as Megan's Law." 7 Most states have some
version of this law which allows information to be released to the public with
respect to an individual defendant based upon the level of risk he poses. Many
states utilize a worksheet to determine the level of risk the offender poses."' Part
of the worksheet examines post-offense behavior and assigns points for refusing
to "accept responsibility" for the sexual conduct in question." 9 The more points
a defendant acquires, the more severe the risk. Other states utilize the worksheet
as a basis for evaluating potential criminal sentences. 20 Afford-type defendants
are, obviously, pointing to this worksheet as another example of the unknown

117. For a comprehensive listing of existing state versions of "Megan's Law,"
otherwise known as Registration, Disclosure and Notification statutes, see Alan R. Kabat,
Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databasesand Community Notification: Sacrificing
PersonalPrivacyfor a Symbol's Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 333, 359-61 (1998).
118. There are a number of different worksheets utilized by the states including the
Sexual Offender Registration Act Risk Assessment Instrument (used in New York); the
Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (used in California); the Sexual
Offender Risk Assessment (used in Tennessee); the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening
Tool (MnSOST); the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R);
and the Static-99. Many of these are considered actuarial assessments with a focus on
static factors only, while others rely on offender input as well.
119. See, e.g., People v. J.G., 655 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
120. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-705 (Supp. 2001).
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consequences of an Alford plea. Courts in both New York and Tennessee have
addressed the problem and have denied the Alford-type defendant any relief.'
The rationale is nearly identical to that which permitted the use of "lack of
remorse" as an aggravating factor for sentencing Alford-type defendants. As a
New York Supreme Court observed, "The defendant cannot have it both ways.
He cannot protest his innocence while pleading guilty by way of an [Alford] plea
and then claim that no consequences or conditions subsequent to the plea should
apply to him."' Once again one ponders why the Alford plea would ever be
chosen in those jurisdictions in which Megan's Law is in effect and this
worksheet is utilized.'23 Why insist on one's innocence when the mere act of
doing so may result in being classified as a high risk sexual offender subject to
community notification? The risk of utilizing an Alford plea when state law uses
a sexual offender worksheet is great. Merely insisting on innocence may result
in a defendant being classified as a high risk sexual offender subject to
community notification. Given the stigma associated with sexual offenses, an
accused sexual offender is likely to see a benefit in the Alford plea because he
may at least protest his innocence to those present in the courtroom at the time
of sentencing. Yet, in the long run, this face saving device may result in more
widespread knowledge of the defendant and his crime than if he merely pled
guilty.
X. OTHER ARGUMENTS
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Aside from the arguments offered above, defendants have attempted some
additional, though less well-argued, attacks on the unanticipated consequences
of the Alford plea problem. The first adopts the argument made by some courts
that it is the defense attorney's responsibility to advise the defendant of the
unexpected consequences of the Aford plea."4 If, as some courts have asserted,
it is the duty of defense counsel to advise the Alford-type defendant of the long
term consequences of the plea, should it not therefore be ineffective assistance
of counsel in those instances in which that information is not provided? 2 ' Some

121. Id.; State v. Ketchum, No. E2001-02008-CCA-R3CD, 2002 WL 1008218, at
*5(Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2002).
122. J.G., 655 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
123. A similar scoring of remorse can be found in the Idaho Domestic Violence
Evaluation, in which evaluators consider the remorse of the defendant for the act of
domestic violence in question when recommending aggression counseling or other
appropriate treatment. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 33.3.
124. People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. 1998).
125. The argument that it is counsel's responsibility to advise the defendant of
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Alford-type defendants have made this argument, seeking to withdraw their
previous guilty pleas due to their attorney's ineffective assistance or mistaken
advice." 6 Success for these defendants has been no easier than for those raising
due process arguments. The test applied by the courts is whether, but for defense
counsel's advise, the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would
have proceeded to trial.'27 In the Alford plea context, no reported opinion has
found this test to be satisfied. One court rejected the ineffective assistance of
counsel argument by returning to the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences.' 28 When looked at in this light, the court concluded, ineffective
assistance of counsel could only arise when a defendant was not advised of the
"direct" consequences of his plea, not merely "collateral" consequences129
Under this line of reasoning, one must question what role counsel actually plays,
given that the courts are also only required to advise defendants of "direct"
consequences.
The other approach taken to deny a defendant's motion to withdraw a
previous guilty plea due to ineffective assistance or mistaken advice is to simply
discount the severity of counsel's omissions or inaccuracies. In State v.
Moddison the defendant alleged that defense counsel had provided him incorrect
information on two separate issues associated with probation. 3 ° The court
conceded that "some of this advice was inaccurate."''
Nonetheless, such
inaccuracies, according to the court, did not warrant a withdrawal of the guilty
plea. "32
' The court concluded that the defendant "had a solid understanding that
his sentence was ultimately subject to the court's unfettered discretion ....
""'
Given that "knowledge," the court observed that it could not "see how Moddison
can reasonably argue that any inaccuracies in the advice described above mean
that his decision to enter into a plea agreement was based on a misunderstanding
so fundamental as to render that decision an uninformed one."'34 The court went
on to suggest that the real reason Moddison entered a plea agreement was

these long term consequences was best advanced in Birdsong. See id.

126. See State v. Moddison, 926 P.2d 253 (Mont. 1996); Wellington v. Comm'r,
N.H. Dep't of Corr., 666 A.2d 969 (N.H. 1995).
127. Moddison, 926 P.2d at 259; Wellington, 666 A.2d at 971.

128. An excellent examination of the relationship between collateral consequences
of guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel is found in Gabriel J. Chin & Richard
W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 697 (2002).

129. Wellington, 666 A.2d at 971-72.
130. Moddison, 926 P.2d at 259.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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because of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 131 Such arguments simply

reveal a misunderstanding of the perceived utility of the Alford plea. If the only
reason the plea was entered was the overwhelming evidence of guilt, why not just
plead guilty? The reason is simple-the defendant wishes to obtain the perceived
benefit of retaining the ability to protest his innocence. Clearly, the efficacy of
this benefit would be of paramount importance to a defendant in weighing his
options. To have counsel provide incorrect information about these benefits (or
provide no information at all) would, it seems, clearly affect the defendant's
decision to enter the plea.
B. Self-Incrimination
A second unusual argument offered by Alford-type defendants when
confronted with a subsequent demand that they admit their guilt is to claim that
such a requirement deprives them of their right against self-incrimination. 36 This
argument could apply in two scenarios. First, an Alford-type defendant could
protest any post-conviction treatment requirements that would require him to
disclose other improper or illegal conduct as part of the overall treatment. This
is a valid concern, particularly for sexual offender treatment in which disclosure
of the defendant's entire sexual history may be considered vital to effective
treatment.137 At least one court has noted the concern this raises and implicitly
contended that such requirements would be improper. In State v. Jones3 an
Idaho appeals court observed that while it was accepted that a guilty plea waived
one's right against self incrimination, "[t]he waiver applies with respect to those
offenses to which the defendant pleads guilty, but it is not to be construed 'as
being a blanket waiver with respect to other offenses that might be charged
against [the defendant] later."" 39 This principal was confirmed by the United
States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Murphy,4 where the court observed that,
while it may be necessary to ask incriminating questions as part of administering
a probation system, the answers may not be used against the defendant.' 4 '

135. Id.

136. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be awitness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. This protection was extended to the states via the Fourteenth

Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
137. See, e.g., Katherine Corry Eastman, Sexual Abuse Treatment in Kansas's
Prisons: CompellingInmates to Admit Guilt, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 949, 952-53 (1999).
138. 926 P.2d 1318 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Krogmann v. United States, 225 F.2d 220, 226 (6th
Cir. 1955)).
140. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
141. Id. at 437.
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The second and more common scenario is that in which the Alford-type
defendant argues that his right against self incrimination is violated when he is
required to admit to conduct associated with his guilty plea. Courts considering
this argument have uniformly rejected it.' 42 The first rationale for rejecting such
a claim is that it is commonly accepted that a guilty plea carries with it the waiver
of certain rights, including the right against compulsory self-incrimination. 43
Second, states often have statutory prohibitions against the use of information
obtained in the context of parole or probation against the defendant. In Razor v.
Commonwealth for example, the court noted that Kentucky statutes expressly
prohibit the use of information gained by probation or parole officers in their
official capacity as evidence against a defendant in any court.'" In light of these
protections, the self-incrimination argument as to a post-conviction requirement
of acknowledgment of guilt will not succeed. When additional criminal charges
cannot be based on statements made by defendants after sentencing and many
state statutes prohibit statements made to probation and parole officers from
being used against defendants, the self-incrimination argument has few legs to
stand on when contesting a post-conviction requirement that defendants
acknowledge their guilt.
XI. SOLUTIONS?
Despite the rather complex web of problems that spin out of an Alford plea,
the solution is arguably obvious. The central theme running throughout this
Article has been the lack of knowledge defendants have with respect to the real
consequences ofanAlfordplea. If we wish to continue accepting the Alford plea,
we must find a way to fill in the knowledge gaps. One way would be to place the
burden upon criminal defense attorneys. Courts could rule that failure to advise

142. See People v. Fleming, 3 P.3d 449, 452 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); Razor v.
Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 472,474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908
(Mont. 1995). Interestingly, the defendant in Fleming also attempted a double jeopardy
argument, claiming that it was improper for him to be required to complete a
psychosexual evaluation for purposes of determining appropriate counseling when he,
by Alford plea, pled guilty to a simple assault rather than the originally charged sexual

assault. The court denied this argument, favorably quoting the Colorado Sex Offender
Management Board guidelines: "While it is preferable that sexual crimes not be plea
bargained to non-sexual crimes, such plea bargains sometimes occur. However, this does
not eliminate the need for the offender to be assessed based on the factual basis of the
case."

Fleming, 3 P.3d at 452 (quoting COLO. SEXUAL OFFENDER MGMT. BD.,

STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION, TREATMENT AND
BEHAVIORAL MONITORING OF ADULT SEX OFFENDERS 452 (1998)).

143. Butler,900 P.2d at 911 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243 (1969)).
144. Razor, 960 S.W.2d at 474 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.510 (Michie

1999)).
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the defendant of all of the potential consequences of an Alford plea would
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and could result in a negation of the
original plea and a return to square one. The problem here is twofold. First, the
threat of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel is no great leverage on a
criminal defense attorney. While criminal defense attorneys would obviously
prefer that such a finding not be part of the record, there are no actual
consequences of such a finding.'45 In fact, defense attorneys may encourage such
findings because they will assist their clients in obtaining a new trial or other
remedy. 146 Second, such a remedy is too drawn out and costs the defendant too
much time and effort. By the time a reviewing court has determined that the
defendant should have been told of the possible consequences of his plea he will
likely have already suffered the consequences or a great amount of time will have
elapsed. Forcing defense attorneys to fill in the knowledge gap is simply not an
efficient way to inform defendants of the potential consequences of an
Alford plea.

The better way to handle Alford pleas would be to affirmatively require the
court to provide the defendant with knowledge about the consequences of the
proposed plea. At the time of the acceptance of the plea the court would be
required to inform the defendant that he is entitled to claim his innocence only
at the time of sentencing. After the change of plea hearing is over, the defendant
is no longer entitled to proclaim innocence as part of the plea agreement.
Refusing to admit guilt to probation officers, counselors, parole officers and other
rehabilitation officers may result in the defendant having his sentence enhanced
(or not reduced), probation revoked, parole denied, or being classified as a sexual
offender. Were that to occur, the defendant could not claim that he is permitted
to deny his guilt as part of his plea bargain. The court would then be required to
ask the defendant if he understood these consequences. The court would finally
be required to ask the defendant if, knowing these consequences, he still wished
to enter an Alford plea. This requirement is not overly onerous as the court
already engages in a lengthy colloquy with the defendant with respect to a
number of other rights which will be affected by a plea of guilty.
The only difficulty is finding the means by which courts would be required
to provide such information. Theoretically, the courts could impose these
requirements on themselves if they view the above mentioned colloquy as
constitutionally required. However, it is likely to be pointless to continue to
argue that such information is necessary in order to protect due process. The
direct versus collateral consequences debate is not likely to shift, particularly

145. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 62 (2000).

146. For a discussion of this tactic, see United States v. Altamirano, 633 F.2d 147,
150-52 (9th Cir. 1980); Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 367 (8th Cir. 1968); and
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531, 1541 (1963).
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because a finding that the consequences of an Alford plea are direct
consequences of a guilty plea would likely open the door for reexamination of
other sentencing consequences the courts have labeled as collateral- something
well beyond the intent of the underlying argument. Rather, the more appropriate
mechanism would be statute or rule. The state legislatures or Congress could
pass rules of criminal procedure that require the court to advise the defendant of
the consequences of an Alford plea. Only then will a mechanism exist whereby
the knowledge gap can be filled.
Once a defendant has been advised of the limitations on his ability to protest
his innocence and the potential consequences of an Alford plea, he may decide
for himself whether the negative aspects of the plea outweigh the positives.
Many defendants will no doubt still enter an Alford plea, but many may also
reevaluate the utility of the plea. Given the long term consequences, the
sentencing risk after trial would be less than the risk of enhanced sentencing,
denial of probation, or later denial of parole simply due to the choice ofanAlford
plea. In any event, a defendant could make an assessment with full knowledge.
It is much easier to accept negative results if the results were contemplated in a
informed manner by a defendant willing to take the risks.
XII. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, the main question is whether the Alford plea is really
the boon to criminal defendants that some perceive it to be. To engage in such
an evaluation, it is useful to reflect on the perceived advantages of the plea:
certainty, minimizing severity, and, for lack of a better word, honesty. It has been
contended that the Afford plea allows for minimization of punishment for
defendants (as do most plea bargains) while still permitting them to protest their
innocence. Is this really the case? As has been illustrated above, because of the
"remorse" factor, the Alford-type defendant may face a greater penalty than the
defendant who merely pled guilty. While courts have gone to some lengths to
claim that Afford-type defendants do not, per se, get enhanced sentences for
"lack[ing] remorse,"' 47 the reality is that the Alford-type defendant must go
through some rather complicated explications in order to appear remorseful and
yet maintain his claim of innocence as permitted by the plea itself.
In addition, the severity of a punishment cannot be evaluated only at the
time of sentencing. In the case of the Alfordplea, punishments are arguably more
severe because the likelihood of having probation revoked or parole denied is
greater than for those who simply enter a guilty plea. It is very likely that Alfordtype defendants who insist on proclaiming their innocence will have their
probation revoked if counseling requires some acknowledgment of guilt. They
are also likely to be denied parole if the parole board demands some type of

147. Smith v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
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contrition. Thus, the Alford-type defendant is not gaining a bargain. He is not
likely to be able to profess innocence and receive a less severe sentence. Rather,
he will receive the perception of such a bargain, only to have this perception
destroyed. If the purpose of the Alford plea is only to persuade a reluctant
defendant to plead guilty with promises of the ability to profess innocence, then
it is quite successful. If the purpose is truly to provide a "bargain" to the
defendant, then it is false gold.
The same can be said of the perceived benefit of certainty. Proponents of
the Alford plea argue that, just as with other plea bargains, the Alford plea allows
the defendant to acquire a degree of certainty as to his eventual punishment in
exchange for a guilty plea with the added bonus of being able to profess
innocence. In reality, however, as the cases have illustrated, the Alford-type
defendant is subject to more uncertainty as to his punishment than the typical
defendant who merely pleads guilty. First, at sentencing, the Alford-type
defendant is unsure whether his continued claims of innocence will enhance his
sentence or will deny him a mitigation of his sentence because of "lack of
remorse." Second, if placed on probation, the Alford-type defendant may be
subject to revocation of probation for continuing to profess innocence during
counseling, even though the court does not have to inform him of this possibility
at sentencing. Finally, the Alford-type defendant sentenced to prison may be
denied parole because of his continuing claim of innocence, even though the
sentencing court need not inform him of this possibility. In all of these situations,
the adverse consequences flow from the defendant's adherence to a claim of
innocence that the court permitted at sentencing. The only certain thing about the
Alford-type defendant's punishment is that it will likely be something the
defendant did not expect at the time he entered the plea.
Finally, proponents claim that the Alford plea does not encourage the
defendant to lie-thus encouraging some form of honesty with counsel and the
courts. Of all of the professed advantages of the Alford plea, this is the most
misguided. If we assume that a truly innocent defendant utilizes the Alford plea,
and sees it as an advantage to plead guilty despite his innocence in order to obtain
a plea bargain, then it is true that at the time of enteringthe plea the Alford plea
enables the defendant to be honest. Yet, from then on, honesty will only enhance
the punishment the defendant might face. At sentencing, the defendant is
expected to express remorse, yet it is not reasonable to expect remorse from a
truly innocent defendant. Thus, honesty is discouraged at sentencing. If the
defendant is placed on probation with a counseling requirement, he may be
expected to accept responsibility for the crime in order to successfully complete
that program. Yet, an innocent defendant could not honestly admit to committing
the offense. Thus, to avoid revocation of his probation, the innocent, honest
Alford-type defendant would be wise to lie. If in prison, the parole board may
demand accepting responsibility for the offense as a basis for granting parole.
Yet, once again, the innocent Alford-type defendant could not honestly admit to
committing the offense and would be encouraged to lie in order to obtain parole.
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Surely, honesty within the system should extend beyond the date of entering a
guilty plea. Is it really an advantage to encourage honesty at sentencing only to
discourage it at every other occasion within the criminal justice system?
The prime beneficiary of the Alford plea is the criminal defense attorney.
Gone are the days when defense counsel, confronted with a defendant adamantly
insisting on his innocence, was forced to either forgo a favorable plea bargain or
compel his client to admit guilt on the record. Confronting a defendant with the
need to plead guilty was rarely a pleasant experience for defense counsel and in
many instances could be perceived as borderline unethical. With the Alford plea,
however, defense counsel can negotiate a favorable plea agreement, and the
defendant does not even have to admit guilt. This approach avoids all of the
unpleasantness associated with confronting a defendant with the need to accept
responsibility in exchange for a favorable plea. What defense attorney would not
prefer this approach to the pre-Alford alternatives?148 This affection for the
Alford plea may make defense counsel hesitant to explain all of the details of the
long term consequences of an Alford plea, assuming that defense counsel is even
aware of those consequences.
Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that the judiciary, despite frequent
expressions of distaste for the Alford plea, continues to accept it. In the Alford
decision, the Court provided a way out for the courts when it noted, "Our holding
does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty
plea merely because a defendant wishes to so plead.... Likewise, the States may
bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their
innocence."' 49 Despite this, courts continue to approve Alford pleas at both the
federal and state level. Why? It could be argued that as unpalatable as the Alford
plea is, it does have the virtue of taking a case off the active docket and freeing
up the court's time for the typical backlog of cases. In large urban areas docket
pressure would seem to encourage an even greater acceptance of the Alford plea
by the judiciary. This consequence was not unforeseen. As one commentator
noted soon after the Alford decision,
It is submitted that the Alford decision is due at least in part to the
crowded-docket anxiety, the fear that the courts will be overwhelmed
unless the instances in which the plea of guilty is allowed are
increased. But the cure for the problem of the crowded docket is
legislative and administrative reform, not an undermining of the very
rights that the courts are designed to protect.'

148. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 1278-89 (describing the tactics criminal
defense attorneys utilized prior to Alford when dealing with defendants who insisted on
their innocence).
149. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.l 1 (1970).
150. Timothy J. Simmons, VoluntarinessofGuilty Pleas,49 N.C.L. REV. 795,801
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One suspects that this conclusion was correct and the continuing acceptance of
the Alford plea, in part, is based on this rationale.
Conceptually, the Alford plea is illogical. Judges are most aware of this,
perhaps explaining a great deal of the Alford plea jurisprudence detailed by this
Article. As one court observed in passing,
[I]t is unseemly, to say the least, for courts-whose charge is
justice-to condone convictions without trial of those who proclaim
their innocence. Indeed, the expediency-based practice has all the
hallmarks of an Alice-in-Wonderland charade. Since it permits
defendants who are in fact guilty to think they are getting away with
something, the Alford-type plea also impedes rehabilitation.'
Given these perceptions, it is little wonder that courts have consistently and
nearly uniformly denied Alford-type defendants the right to continue to profess
their innocence beyond the time of their plea. In light of the overwhelming body
of cases imposing significant long term hardships on those who choose the Alford
plea, it is clear that defendants should look at the Alford plea with more than just
a bit of suspicion. Perhaps the best Alford plea is the plea not taken.

(1971).
151. State v. Weaver, No. 91-2568-CR-FT, 1992 WL 126807, at *2 n.1 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
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